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KAESTNER FAILS: THE WAY FORWARD 
MITCHELL M. GANS* 
ABSTRACT 
This past term, the Supreme Court applied the Due Process 
Clause to prevent the states from closing down a tax strategy that 
employs out-of-state trusts. Many had hoped that the case would 
serve as a vehicle for the Court to overrule taxpayer-friendly prec-
edents that make the strategy possible. But it failed. The question 
that emerges is whether the decision leaves the states with a path 
to address the strategy and thereby prevent it from being used to 
exacerbate issues of inequality. After examining the decision, this 
Article considers the options available to the states and then sug-
gests a way forward. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In North Carolina Department of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice 
Kaestner 1992 Family Trust,1 decided this past term, the Supreme 
Court held that the Due Process Clause2 precluded North Carolina 
from taxing the income of an out-of-state trust even though a 
beneficiary resided in the state. Two facts were critical to the 
Court’s holding: the trust was under administration in another 
state, where the trustee was located, and no distribution of trust 
income had been made to the beneficiary.3 North Carolina, in short, 
lacked sufficient contacts with the trust to justify its tax.4 
 In recent years, a planning strategy designed to reduce state 
income tax, similar to the one employed by the Kaestner family, 
has proliferated—surprisingly abetted by the Internal Revenue 
Service.5 The strategy exploits the due process limitations the 
states encounter when they seek to tax transactions or activity 
occurring beyond their borders. When the Court granted certio-
rari in Kaestner, many had hoped that the Court would take the 
opportunity to sweep away the limitations, or at least minimize 
them, in order to diminish the strategy’s effectiveness—similar 
to a step it had taken the previous term in an analogous context.6 
 These hopes were unfortunately dashed. Kaestner turned 
out to be a poor vehicle for, in essence, two reasons. 
 First, the case was not a compelling one. North Carolina’s 
connection to the trust’s income was particularly weak.7 After 
all, no distribution had been made to the beneficiary, and it was 
possible that she would never receive one given the trustee’s dis-
cretion under the trust instrument.8 Thus, in seeking to tax the 
income, North Carolina had to overcome a well-established tax 
1 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall ... deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....”). 
3 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2216. 
4 Id. 
5 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2018). 
6 The Court overruled a Commerce Clause precedent in the sales tax con-
text, explaining its concern that the precedent had created “market distortions” 
and that it “has come to serve as a judicially created tax shelter.” Id. at 2094. 
7 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2218. 
8 Id.  
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norm: the imposition of the income tax generally requires either 
receipt or, at the very least, a legal entitlement.9 Indeed, the ma-
jority emphasized the narrowness of its holding and the possibility 
of a different outcome had additional contacts with the state been 
present.10 The upside, if there is one, is that, in adopting a nar-
row holding, the Court has reserved wide latitude to address more 
compelling cases in the future. 
 Second, the decision may reflect a fissure among the Jus-
tices on the application of stare decisis. Key precedents favored 
the taxpayer. And reading between the lines, one can discern a 
hesitation among at least some of the Justices in the majority to 
“normalize” the overruling of precedent in the constitutional set-
ting given the impending battle over abortion and other issues. 
So, to the extent that North Carolina’s position hinged on the over-
ruling of these key precedents, this larger battle may have cast a 
critical shadow. 
 Perhaps because of this tension over stare decisis, finding 
a more compelling vehicle may prove to be difficult. Indeed, one 
week after its decision in Kaestner, the Court denied a certiorari 
petition in a case where the contacts between the trust and the 
state were much more substantial, permitting a state supreme 
court decision upholding the strategy to stand.11 
 What, then, is the way forward for the states? Much is at 
stake. For states that impose an income tax, designed to achieve 
a more progressive distribution of the tax burden, taxing invest-
ment income is critical. Failure to eliminate the strategy will 
certainly exacerbate inequality. Although the Kaestner decision is 
problematic, it does, as it will be argued, leave a legislative path 
for the states. 
 Part I provides an explanation of the out-of-state trust 
strategy.12 It provides a brief policy critique of the strategy, 
demonstrating that states would be able to easily close it down 
were they not constrained by the due process limitations the Court 
has imposed. 
9 Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
10 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2221. 
11 Fielding v. Comm’r, 916 N.W.2d 323 (Minn. 2018), cert. denied, Bauerly 
v. Fielding, 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019). For a discussion of the possible motiva-
tions for denying certiorari in Fielding, see infra Section III.B. 
12 Infra Part I. 
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 Part II examines the Kaestner facts and the Court’s anal-
ysis.13 Although, as suggested, the majority sought to limit its 
holding, it did provide some concrete guidance, which is briefly 
explored. The three-Justice concurring opinion argued that no 
aspect of two taxpayer-friendly precedents should be reconsid-
ered. The majority’s refusal to embrace these precedents on such 
an expansive basis reflects, as will be argued, the tension among 
the Justices over stare decisis. 
 Part III explores three options available to the states in 
the face of Kaestner14: a wealth tax based on the value of the 
beneficiary’s interest in the trust; use of what is referred to as 
the founder’s principle, under which the trust is taxed in the 
state where the grantor resides at its inception; and an expanded 
application of the grantor-trust concept, which is currently em-
ployed on a more limited basis at the federal level to tax the 
grantor on the trust’s income.15 
 Concluding that the first two options are questionable in 
terms of validity or effectiveness, Part III suggests that the 
states consider legislation that would embrace the grantor-trust 
approach. Under this approach, a taxpayer who conveys assets 
to an out-of-state discretionary trust for the benefit of family 
members would remain taxable on all of the trust’s income. This 
would largely, if not entirely, eliminate the strategy. Part III also 
examines a fourth option available to the states, suggesting the 
adoption of a throwback principle, referenced in Kaestner, to prevent 
any remaining abuse that might escape the grantor-trust concept. 
 Part IV briefly argues against due process in the tax set-
ting at a more fundamental level.16 If the precedents limiting the 
states’ ability to tax out-of-state transactions (including Kaestner) 
were overruled, the Commerce Clause could do the work that fed-
eralism requires in this context. This would not only give the 
states more room to address abusive strategies but also give Con-
gress the regulatory role it needs to establish uniform, sensible 
tax policy across the country. 
 This Article concludes in the last few paragraphs.17 
13 Infra Part II. 
14 Infra Part III. 
15 Under I.R.C. section 671, trusts are ignored for federal tax purposes if they 
meet certain conditions. The Code refers to such trusts as “grantor trusts.” Id. 
16 Infra Part IV. 
17 Infra Conclusion. 
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I. THE OUT-OF-STATE TRUST STRATEGY (OR PROBLEM) 
 To illustrate the out-of-state trust problem, consider this 
scenario: Taxpayer resides in a state that imposes an income tax 
on its residents. Taxpayer has substantial investment assets and 
would like to avoid paying state tax on the income those assets 
generate. Perhaps, in addition, Taxpayer anticipates selling an 
appreciated investment asset and would also like to avoid paying 
state tax on the appreciation. 
 How might Taxpayer accomplish her objectives? She could 
transfer the investment assets to a trustee located in a state with-
out an income tax, with trust administration to occur in that 
state (the situs state). If the trust instrument does not mandate 
distribution to the beneficiaries, but instead gives the trustee 
discretion regarding distributions, the income earned by the trust, 
as well as any appreciation generated on the trust’s sale of the as-
sets, could be accumulated in the trust free of state income tax. 
 The trust itself would not be required to pay any tax given 
that the situs state does not impose an income tax. The benefi-
ciaries, even if they live in a state with an income tax, would not be 
subject to tax on the trust’s income if no distribution is made to 
them. And the grantor would, as a general matter, not be required 
to report the trust’s income on her state tax return. Note that the 
effectiveness of the strategy hinges on the selection of an out-of-
state trustee: had Taxpayer instead selected an in-state trustee, 
all the trust’s undistributed income could be taxed in the Tax-
payer’s state. 
 In 2017, Congress enacted legislation that simultaneously 
makes the out-of-state trust strategy both more attractive and 
easier to accomplish.18 First, in terms of attractiveness, the 2017 
changes limit the amount of state income tax that is deductible 
on a federal return.19 If a taxpayer is not permitted to fully de-
duct (or deduct at all) her state income tax, the after-federal tax 
cost of the state income tax is of course increased.20 The increased 
18 Tax Cuts & Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
19 I.R.C. § 164(b)(6) (limiting deductions for state and local income and other 
taxes to $10,000 for years 2018 through 2025). 
20 Briefing Book: The State of State (and Local) Tax Policy, TAX POL’Y CTR., 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-does-deduction-state-and  
-local-taxes-work [https://perma.cc/R3NZ-ALEV]. 
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cost, in turn, creates greater incentive for taxpayers to engage in 
strategies designed to reduce the amount of state income tax.21 
 Second, in terms of ease of accomplishment, in the past, the 
federal gift tax served as a deterrent: taxpayers who made gifts, 
whether in trust or outright, exposed themselves to gift tax lia-
bility.22 Thus, before adopting an out-of-state trust strategy, tax-
payers had to consider the cost of the gift tax. Although taxpayers 
found creative, complicated ways to implement the strategy while 
sidestepping gift tax liability—surprisingly with some assistance 
from the Internal Revenue Service in the form of taxpayer-
friendly private letter rulings23—the 2017 legislation increased 
gift exemptions to a level that make the gift tax irrelevant as a 
practical matter to almost all taxpayers.24 With the gift tax thus 
no longer as much of a deterrent, the out-of-state trust strategy 
is less difficult to implement. 
 As a policy matter, the strategy is indefensible. As is the 
case with most tax strategies, it results in inequity and ineffi-
ciency. Consider first the question of inequity. Horizontal equity 
requires that two similarly situated taxpayers make the same 
contribution to the cost of government.25 If a taxpayer is permit-
ted to avoid state income tax by adopting the strategy, she makes 
less of a contribution to the cost of state government than other 
similarly situated taxpayers who opt against the strategy. 
 The strategy is also offensive as a matter of vertical equity, 
which inquires whether differently situated taxpayers are required 
to make an appropriately different contribution to the cost of gov-
ernment.26 Wealthier taxpayers, almost by definition, have more 
investment assets than the less wealthy. To the extent they can use 
21 Id. 
22 I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (2012). 
23 See Jeffrey Schoenblum, Strange Bedfellows: The Federal Constitution, 
Out-of-State Nongrantor Accumulation Trusts, and the Complete Avoidance of 
State Income Taxation, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1945, 1963–67 (2014) (discussing the 
strategy and favorable Internal Revenue Service private rulings making the 
strategy possible). 
24 I.R.C. § 2505 (2018); Rev. Proc. 2018-57 (federal gift tax exemption of 
$11,400,000 in 2019). 
25 See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical 
Equity: the Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 607–08 (1993). 
26 See, e.g., id. 
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the strategy to avoid paying income tax on the dividends, interest, 
and gains these assets produce, they undercut the progressive 
objectives the state income tax is designed to achieve. Moreover, 
they tend to be better advised and will likely find the cost and 
inconvenience of creating and maintaining an out-of-state trust to 
be insignificant relative to the potential tax savings. All of this 
will, as a practical matter, result in the wealthy disproportionately 
implementing the strategy—permitting them to make a reduced 
contribution to the cost of state government that is inappropri-
ate relative to the contribution required of others. 
 Vertical equity is a significant issue at the state level.27 
Those states that are somewhat successful in making their tax 
system less regressive (or perhaps more progressive) rely on the 
income tax to achieve this outcome.28 To the extent, however, 
that these states are constitutionally required to permit taxpayers 
to use the out-of-state trust strategy and thereby avoid income tax 
on their investment returns, the states’ ability to redress inequality 
is of course undermined—thus exacerbating vertical equity issues.29 
 As for inefficiency, tax strategies, in general, encourage 
behaviors that have no purpose other than reduction in tax lia-
bility. Taxpayers who implement the out-of-state trust strategy 
are required to create and maintain trusts that otherwise serve 
no constructive purpose. In that sense, they are inefficient.30 
 Given this policy critique, the only question is how to elimi-
nate the problem—in other words, to close down the out-of-state 
trust as a tax-saving strategy. Absent constitutional constraints, 
27 See, e.g., Who Pays: A Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 
50 States (6th ed. 2018), INST. TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y, https://itep.org/whopays/ 
[https://perma.cc/QK4Y-EZQL]. 
28 See id. 
29 Achieving a progressive tax structure at the state level is difficult enough on 
its own terms. See, e.g., Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: 
Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution?, 51 
UCLA L. REV. 1389, 1410 (2004). The out-of-state trust makes it even more dif-
ficult to achieve. Id. 
30 Cf. Lawrence Zelenak, For Better and Worse: The Differing Income Tax 
Treatments of Marriage at Different Income Tax Levels, 93 N.C. L. REV. 783, 
794 (2015) (referencing Professor Bittker’s observation that inefficiency results 
to the extent tax-incentive strategies are utilized and therefore impact behav-
ior and that inequity results to the extent they are not). 
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the solution would be straightforward. The strategy would fail to 
work if the state in which the taxpayer resides could impose its 
income tax on any trust created by one of its residents—or if, as in 
Kaestner, the state in which the beneficiary resides could tax the 
trust. But the difficulty is that the trustee would argue, as did the 
Kaestner trust,31 that the Due Process Clause precludes the state 
from taxing income in the absence of a sufficient contact with the 
state. This argument was, of course, successful in Kaestner.32 
 Before turning to a consideration of the options available 
to the states given Kaestner, a careful examination of the case is 
first necessary. 
II. EXAMINATION OF KAESTNER 
A. Kaestner Facts 
 Almost 30 years ago, Joseph Rice III, a New York domicil-
iary, created a trust for the benefit of his children.33 He named a 
New Yorker as trustee and made New York law controlling.34 He 
continued to reside in New York.35 The trustee moved to Florida 
in 1995, continuing to administer the trust until his retirement 
in 2005.36 At that time, he was replaced by a new trustee, who 
was domiciled in Connecticut and who has administered the trust 
in the years since his appointment.37 
 At the trust’s inception, no beneficiary resided in North 
Carolina.38 But, in 1997, Mr. Rice’s daughter, Kimberly Kaestner,39 
moved to North Carolina and lived there during the relevant years 
31 N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 
S. Ct. 2213, 2216 (2019). 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 2218. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Brief for Petitioner at 10, N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 
1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213 (No. 18-457), 2019 WL 949892, at *10. 
37 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2218 n.2. 
38 Id. at 2218. 
39 While the trust, as originally created, was for the benefit of Rice’s chil-
dren, it was later divided into three subtrusts. As a result, a subtrust for the 
benefit of Kaestner and her children was created with the same terms as the 
original trust. This subtrust is the taxpayer before the Court. Id. at 2218. 
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with her minor children.40 Under the terms of the trust, the trus-
tee was given “absolute discretion” to distribute the trust assets to 
the beneficiaries “in such amounts and proportions” as the trustee 
might determine.41 At age 40, Kaestner would become entitled to 
receive the trust assets outright.42 Under New York law, subject to 
statutory limitations, a trustee may decant a trust and thereby 
in effect amend its terms.43 And, in fact, after the tax years un-
der consideration, the trustee used this authority to extend the 
term of the trust to eliminate Kaestner’s right to receive the as-
set at age 40.44 He did so “after consulting with Kaestner and in 
accordance with her wishes.”45 
 As North Carolina conceded, the beneficiaries’ residence in 
the state was its only connection to the trust.46 The trust’s records 
were maintained in New York.47 And the trust’s asset custodian 
was located in Massachusetts.48 During the years in question, only 
two meetings between Kaestner and the trustee occurred, both held 
in New York.49 Kaestner did receive trust accountings,50 which 
were presumably sent to her home. 
 Although the trust enjoyed significant income in the years at 
issue, the trustee made no distribution.51 North Carolina sought to 
tax the trust on its undistributed income, arguing that the bene-
ficiaries’ residence was a sufficient connection to the State to over-
come the due process argument made by the trust.52 The North 
Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the trust, concluding that the 
imposition of the income tax on the trust’s undistributed income 
was inconsistent with due process53 (but the court did not reach the 
Dormant Commerce Clause issue54). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 2219. 
43 N.Y. EST., POWERS AND TRUSTS § 10-6.6(b) (McKinney 2019). 
44 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2219. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 2220. 
47 Id. at 2218. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 2218 n.3. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 2220. 
52 Id. 
53 Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 
814 S.E.2d 43, 50–51 (N.C. 2018). 
54 Id. at 47. 
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B. Court’s Decision 
1. Narrow Holding 
 Ruling for the taxpayer, the Court adopted a narrow holding: 
that, as a matter of due process, the presence of the beneficiaries 
in North Carolina does not, in and of itself, permit the state to 
impose its income tax on the trust’s undistributed income where 
the beneficiaries have no right to demand the income and are 
uncertain about receiving it in the future given the trustee’s dis-
cretion.55 As will be discussed, the concurring opinion makes the 
narrowness of the majority’s holding even more apparent. Justice 
Alito, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Gorsuch, argued in the 
concurring opinion that no aspect of two key taxpayer-friendly 
precedents (Brooke v. Norfolk56 and Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of 
Baltimore v. Virginia57) should be open for re-examination. But the 
majority resisted such a wholesale endorsement of these precedents, 
instead limiting its holding and thus leaving itself wide latitude 
in terms of future cases involving other factual permutations.58 
2. No New Ground 
 The Court does not break new ground. It instead applies the 
now-familiar standard for assessing due process limitations on state 
taxes and adheres to several key precedents. It reiterates that, in 
applying the standard, a two-pronged inquiry is required: first, 
quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,59 the Court asks whether there 
is “some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state 
and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax;” and second, 
again quoting Quill, it asks whether “the income attributed to the 
55 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2221. Later in the opinion, the Court intimates 
that taxation in the state where the beneficiary resides would be permissible 
where the beneficiary can “control, possess, enjoy, or receive trust assets.” Id. 
This is somewhat inconsistent with the Court’s expressly stated holding, which 
appears to suggest that such a tax would only be appropriate where the bene-
ficiary has the right to demand and receive the income. See id. 
56 See 277 U.S. 27, 28–29 (1928). 
57 See 280 U.S. 83, 92–93 (1929). 
58 See Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2226. 
59 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992). 
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state for tax purposes” is “rationally related to ‘values connected 
to the taxing state.’”60 It then concludes that the state was una-
ble to satisfy the first prong, obviating the need to examine the 
second one.61 
 Quoting from International Shoe Co. v. Washington,62 as 
well as Quill, the Court elaborates that the first prong requires 
“certain minimum contacts” with the state so that the tax “does 
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.” If someone does not “derive ‘benefits and protection[s]’ 
from associating with a State,” she should not be subject to the 
state’s taxing power.63 
3. Analyzing Contacts in Trust Context 
 Applying these principles in the context of the Kaestner 
trust, the Court does not focus on the trust as a distinct entity.64 
Had it done so, its focus would have necessarily been limited to 
the contacts between the trustee and the state, making the 
grantor’s or the beneficiaries’ contacts with the state irrelevant. 
Instead, the Court takes a more global approach, asking whether 
the contacts of any of the trust’s “constituents” (trustee, grantor 
or beneficiary)65 are sufficient to justify the tax. In the language 
of the Court, contacts between the trust’s “constituents” and the 
state may be considered “alone or in combination.”66 Questions will 
inevitably arise about how to determine whether distinct contacts 
are sufficient when considered in combination with each other. 
 Consideration will also need to be given to the relevance of 
contacts other than the presence of an in-state beneficiary. Indeed, 
as will be discussed,67 one week after the Kaestner decision, the 
60 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 306). 
61 See id. at 2223–24. 
62 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
63 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319). 
64 Citing its decision in Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486 
(1947), the Court does, however, acknowledge that a trust is generally treated as 
a separate entity for federal income tax purposes. Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 
2218 n.1. 
65 See id. at 2220. 
66 Id. 
67 See infra Section III.B. 
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Court denied certiorari in Fielding v. Commissioner of Revenue,68 
where the Supreme Court of Minnesota held the state’s tax on a 
trust unconstitutional despite the presence of multiple contacts 
in addition to the presence of an in-state beneficiary: the gran-
tor’s residence in the state both at inception and during the tax 
year; a provision in the trust instrument designating the state’s 
law as controlling; a trust investment in a corporation having prop-
erty physically located within the state; and the grantor’s use of 
an in-state law firm to draft the trust instrument.69 The rele-
vance and weight of such contacts will need to be considered in the 
lower courts, if not eventually in the Supreme Court. 
4. Majority Provides Some Concrete Guidance 
 While the Court does not go beyond its conclusion that the 
mere presence of an in-state beneficiary is an insufficient con-
tact, it does give some concrete guidance. First, citing Maguire v. 
Trefry,70 it reiterates that where a distribution is made to the 
beneficiary, the state where the beneficiary resides is permitted 
to tax it as income.71 
 Second, citing Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport,72 it 
points out that the state in which the trustee resides is permitted 
to tax the trust.73 
 Third, citing Hanson v. Denckla,74 it indicates that the state 
in which the trust is administered, its situs, is permitted to tax 
the trust.75 
 Fourth, the Court explains that, in assessing a contact be-
tween an in-state beneficiary and an out-of-state trust, the 
Court has focused on the “beneficiary’s right to control, possess, 
68 916 N.W.2d 323 (Minn. 2018), cert. denied, Bauerly v. Fielding, 139 S. 
Ct. 2773 (2019). 
69 Id. at 330, 334. 
70 253 U.S. 12, 16–17 (1920). 
71 The Court also cites Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 21–23 
(1938), for this proposition. 
72 331 U.S. 486 (1947). 
73 N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 
S. Ct. 2213, 2220 (2019). 
74 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
75 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220.  
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enjoy or receive trust assets.”76 While this principle is consistent 
with well-accepted tax norms,77 questions may arise about its 
implementation. 
 For example, if the beneficiary has the right to select the 
people, other than herself, who will eventually be entitled to the 
accumulated income (through what is known as a special power 
of appointment78), would this constitute sufficient control? Or what 
if the beneficiary has no present right to receive the accumulated 
income but does have a right to receive it at some designated point 
in the future?79 Implementing the Court’s rights-based principle 
will require that these variations, as well as others, be addressed. 
 Fifth, citing Curry v. McCanless80 and Graves v. Elliot,81 the 
Court observes that the grantor’s control over trust assets under 
76 Id. at 2221. 
77 Cf. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (stating 
“taxpayers [must] have complete dominion” before income is realized for fed-
eral income tax purposes). 
78 For a discussion of special powers of appointment, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 17.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1999). 
79 In Kaestner, as the record reflects, the beneficiary had such a special 
power of appointment. 139 S. Ct. at 2218–19. But the Court does not make 
reference to it, perhaps because it was eliminated through the decanting of 
the trust. And, in Safe Deposit, the beneficiary was entitled to receive the ac-
cumulated income at the age of 25, but his descendants would instead receive 
it if he failed to reach that age. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, 
280 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1929). Consider whether necessary control would be pre-
sent if in a case like Safe Deposit if the beneficiary’s estate, rather than his 
descendants, would be entitled to receive the accumulated income upon a failure 
to reach age 25. 
In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, a Connecticut domiciliary was enti-
tled to receive the out-of-state trust’s income. 733 A.2d 782, 788 (Conn. 1999). 
In addition, she was entitled to receive the trust’s assets upon reaching the 
age of 48. Id. In the event of an earlier death, she could control the disposition of 
the assets through a special power of appointment (limited to her descend-
ants). Id. While the parties agreed that the income to which she was entitled 
was subject to Connecticut tax, there was disagreement about the trust’s un-
distributed capital gain (to which the beneficiary was not presently entitled). 
Id. at 788 n.8. The court rejected the trust’s constitutional argument and up-
held the tax on the undistributed capital gain, concluding that Safe Deposit 
should no longer be followed. But given Kaestner, the question remains 
whether the beneficiary’s rights in Gavin gave her sufficient control to justify 
the Connecticut tax. For further discussion of Gavin, see infra Section III.B.1. 
80 307 U.S. 357 (1939). 
81 307 U.S. 383 (1939). 
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administration in another state can serve as a basis for tax in the 
state where the grantor resides.82 
Sixth, citing Quill, it explains that it “borrows” from its 
adjudicative jurisdiction cases in deciding the due process limi-
tations on state taxation,83 although it refuses to decide whether 
the jurisdictional principles established in Hanson v. Denckla are 
controlling in the tax context.84 
C. Concurring Opinion 
 Although the concurring opinion’s analysis is very similar 
to the majority’s, it appears to suggest a willingness to enforce 
due process limitations on state taxing power more stringently than 
the majority. Three aspects of the opinion suggest a basis for such 
an inference. 
 First, as indicated, the opinion begins with a caution to 
the effect that no points resolved in two pro-taxpayer precedents 
(Brooke and Safe Deposit) are open for reconsideration.85 While 
the majority cites these cases and integrates them into its anal-
ysis, it does not go as far as the concurring opinion’s caution 
about the extent to which they are binding.86 
Second, unlike the majority opinion, the concurring opin-
ion does not reference the cumulative approach to contacts 
adopted by the majority. So, while the majority opinion may be 
read to contemplate the possibility of considering, say, a grantor 
contact in combination with a beneficiary contact in determining 
whether the necessary connection to the taxing state exists,87 the 
concurring Justices would likely find this objectionable. Indeed, 
82 In Curry, the grantor had retained, in the Court’s words, the “power to 
dispose” of property in an out-of-state trust in the form of a general power of 
appointment. The Court upheld the estate tax on the trust assets imposed in 
the state where the grantor had resided. Similarly, in Graves, the grantor 
had created an out-of-state trust subject to retained control in the form of a 
revocation power, and the Court again upheld the estate tax imposed by the 
state of residence. 
83 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220; see also Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 
340, 342 (1954) (stating that jurisdiction is necessary before state can exer-
cise taxing power or judicial authority). 
84 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2224 n.11. 
85 Id. at 2226 (Alito, J., concurring). 
86 But see id. at 2221–22. 
87 Id. at 2220. 
666 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:651 
as will be discussed, the Safe Deposit Court, in finding insuffi-
cient contacts, did not take the grantor’s connection to the taxing 
state into account—and, as indicated, the concurring Justices are 
unwilling to reconsider any aspect of this precedent.88 
 Third, the concurring Justices’ discussion of the decision 
in Brooke is telling—pointing out that the Brooke Court had 
characterized the beneficiary as a mere “stranger” vis-à-vis trust 
assets and thus revealing their view that a discretionary benefi-
ciary bears an attenuated relationship to trust assets.89 Moreover, 
under Brooke, the concurring Justices emphasize, even if an in-
state beneficiary is legally entitled to receive income, that is not 
a justification for taxing an out-of-state trust’s assets.90 Although 
the majority Justices appear to agree with this characterization 
of Brooke,91 it is less clear that they are prepared to treat this 
aspect of the decision as binding. 
 In sum, while the majority seeks to retain wide latitude in 
terms of future cases, the concurring Justices do not want the 
decision to be understood as inviting or permitting arguments that 
would call into question any aspect of Safe Deposit or Brooke. 
III. AVAILABLE OPTIONS 
 Given Kaestner, what options are available to the states? 
Four are considered: a wealth tax; the founder’s principle; an 
expanded application of the grantor-trust concept; and a throw-
back rule. Neither the wealth tax nor the founder’s principle 
would be an ideal solution—the former because it would likely 
be ineffective as a practical matter and the latter because it 
would raise constitutional questions. The other two options are 
more appealing. The Kaestner Court, it will be suggested, left a 
discernible path for an enhanced grantor-trust concept. And it 
explicitly signaled that the states could adopt a throwback rule 
to address the problem. Implemented together, the grantor-trust 
concept and the throwback principle could provide an effective 
and constitutionally permissible solution. 
88 See infra Section III.C.4. 
89 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2227 (Alito, J., concurring). 
90 Id. (citing Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27, 28–29 (1928)). 
91 Id. at 2221 (describing Brooke and Safe Deposit in a manner that is con-
sistent with the description in the concurring opinion). 
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A. Wealth Tax 
 Does Kaestner—along with its reaffirmance of Safe Deposit—
suggest that the state where the beneficiary resides is entirely 
precluded from taxing the beneficiary with respect to the trust in 
the absence of additional contacts? A close reading of Safe Deposit 
suggests otherwise. In Safe Deposit, Virginia, where the beneficiary 
resided,92 sought to impose a tax on the entire trust corpus,93 which 
was in the possession of the trustee in Maryland.94 In finding the 
tax objectionable on due process grounds,95 the Court indicated 
that the tax did not target the value of the beneficiary’s equitable 
interest in the trust but rather the entire corpus.96 And because 
the assets were located in Maryland, the tax was invalidated.97 
 In a concurring opinion, Justice Stone emphasized that 
Virginia had failed to limit the tax to the value of the benefi-
ciary’s equitable interest in the trust, implying that the tax 
would have been upheld had it been so limited.98 In Common-
wealth v. Stewart,99 cited in Kaestner,100 the court embraced this 
implication, upholding a tax imposed by the state in which the 
beneficiary resided based on the value of the beneficiary’s equi-
table interest, even though the trust was under administration 
92 Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 91 (1929). 
93 Id. at 90. 
94 Id. at 91. 
95 Id. at 94. 
96 Id. at 92 (“The power of Virginia to lay a tax upon the fair value of any 
interest in the securities actually owned by one of her resident citizens is not 
now presented for consideration.”). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 95 (Stone, J., concurring) (“... the question whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment forbids a tax on the beneficiaries, in Virginia, where they are 
domiciled, measured by their equitable interests, seems to me not to be pre-
sented .... No attempt was made by Virginia to tax the equitable interests of 
the beneficiaries of the trust. That the thing taxed or the measure of the tax 
is different from the equitable interests of the beneficiaries, as affected by the 
specified contingencies, sufficiently appears from the fact that the one may 
well have been of different value than the other. In fact, the securities seem to 
have been assessed at their full value, although the equitable interests of the 
beneficiaries are less than the whole.”). 
99 12 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1940), aff’d., 312 U.S. 649 (1941). 
100 N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 
S. Ct. 2213, 2223 n.10 (2019). 
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in another state.101 And, in Kaestner itself, the Court describes 
Safe Deposit and Brooke in terms suggesting that a wealth tax 
would be permissible, indicating that “[i]n each case the chal-
lenged tax fell on the entirety of a trust’s property, rather than 
on only the share of trust assets to which the beneficiaries were 
entitled.”102 All of this is consistent with the principle that, as a 
general matter, the state in which the taxpayer resides is per-
mitted to tax all of her property.103 
101 Somewhat analogously, in the corporate context, the Court has upheld 
a tax imposed by the state in which the shareholder resided based on the value 
of shares. First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234, 241 (1937) 
(“But we have recently had occasion to point out that enjoyment by the resi-
dent of a state of the protection of its laws is inseparable from responsibility 
for sharing the costs of its government, and that a tax measured by the value 
of rights protected is but an equitable method of distributing the burdens of 
government among those who are privileged to enjoy its benefits.”). Similarly, 
in Blodgett v. Silberman, distinguished in Safe Deposit, the Court upheld the 
Connecticut estate tax on the value of a partnership interest owned by the 
decedent, who had been domiciled in the state, even though some of the part-
nership’s assets were located elsewhere. 277 U.S. 1, 12 (1928); see also Norfolk & 
W. Ry. Co. v. Mo. State Tax Comm’n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 (1968) (“Any formula 
used must bear a rational relationship, both on its face and in its application, 
to property values connected with the taxing State.”). 
102 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2221. Note also that the concurring opinion, in 
its only footnote, explains that, in Brooke, the beneficiary had a right to in-
come but not trust corpus and that the Court had held that taxing the benefi-
ciary on the corpus was not permissible. Id. at 2227 (Alito, J., concurring). 
This would suggest the concurring Justices would not find a wealth tax on 
the value of the beneficiary’s entitlement to be problematic. 
103 Under several precedents, the Court makes a distinction between in-
come tax and property tax. Resident taxpayers are taxable on income derived 
from all sources, including out-of-state sources. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chicka-
saw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462–63 (1995). On the other hand, in the case of a 
property tax, an important limitation applies: tangible property located in another 
state is not taxable in the state of the taxpayer’s residence. Greenough v. Tax 
Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486, 492 (1947). In the case of intangible per-
sonal property, the state of the taxpayer’s residence is permitted to tax it 
even if located in another state. Id. An amicus brief in Kaestner sought to dis-
tinguish Safe Deposit on the ground that it involved a tax on out-of-state 
property, whereas Kaestner involved a tax on income. Brief of Tax Law Pro-
fessors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16, Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. 
2213 (2019) (No. 18-457), 2019 WL 1093046, at *16. But because the property 
in Safe Deposit was intangible, the limitation on the state’s taxing power with 
respect to property was inapplicable—thus placing Kaestner and Safe Deposit on 
an equal footing in the sense that in neither case was the property-tax limita-
tion relevant. See Greenough, 331 U.S. at 492. For an argument critiquing 
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 To be sure, a wealth tax imposed on the value of a benefi-
ciary’s equitable interest is a possible response to the out-of-state 
trust problem. But given that, in a case like Kaestner, it could 
constitutionally target only the value of the beneficiary’s equita-
ble interest, rather than the value of the assets in the trust, it 
would be less than an ideal solution. Faced with such a tax, ad-
visers could draft out-of-state trusts on a discretionary basis (as 
the Kaestner trust was drafted) in order to minimize the value of 
the beneficiary’s equitable interest and thereby substantially 
reduce—or practically eliminate—the tax. For if the beneficiary 
had no entitlement to receive trust assets but only the hope that 
the trustee might exercise discretion in her favor, valuing the 
beneficiary’s interest would require taking into account the possibil-
ity that the trustee might decide to distribute to other beneficiaries 
or to withhold distributions entirely.104 
 Professor Carla Spivack argues that the Kaestner benefi-
ciaries’ residence in North Carolina should have been a sufficient 
the property-tax limitation, see Boris I. Bittker, The Taxation of Out-of-State 
Tangible Property, 56 YALE L.J. 640 (1947). 
104 See Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 95 (1929) (Stone, J., 
concurring); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 12 A.2d 444, 449 (Pa. 1940) (acknowledg-
ing potential difficulty in valuing equitable interest); cf. Rev. Rul. 67-370, 1967-2 
C.B. 324 (acknowledging the difficulty in valuing an interest subject to the 
control of another). 
Note that, in Kaestner, the Court, in its parenthetical description of Stew-
art, muddies things by including a quotation from the decision to the effect 
that the Stewart beneficiary had a “right to the income.” Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. 
at 2223 n.10. Reading this would suggest that it would be impermissible for 
the state of the beneficiary’s residence to tax the value of a discretionary in-
terest under a wealth tax and would be difficult to reconcile with basic prin-
ciples. See supra text accompanying note 102. The Court muddied the issue 
even further in its discussion of the inability of the Kaestner beneficiary to 
voluntarily transfer her interest. While emphasizing the language in the trust 
instrument prohibiting such transfers, Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2223, the Court 
goes on to state that the question whether a different outcome would be ap-
propriate in the absence of such a prohibition is not resolved. Id. at 2223 n.9. 
To be sure, the beneficiary’s inability to transfer her interest in the trust would 
certainly be relevant in valuing the interest under a wealth tax. But it would 
be wrong to read Kaestner as precluding the states from imposing a wealth tax 
on such an interest. After all, the Court was focusing on the level of the bene-
ficiary’s control over the trust’s undistributed income, not whether the bene-
ficiary had a valuable interest that could be subjected to a wealth tax. See id. 
at 2223. 
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constitutional justification for the imposition of North Carolina’s 
income tax on the trust’s undistributed income (or perhaps a tax 
on the beneficiaries based on the trust’s undistributed income).105 
She argues that the beneficiaries’ equitable interest in the trust 
constitutes a property interest that is an appropriate subject of 
taxation in their state of residence.106 This is consistent with the 
general rule that the state in which a taxpayer resides is permitted 
to tax all property owned by the taxpayer.107 But, given Kaestner 
as well as Safe Deposit, this does not justify the imposition of an 
income tax on the undistributed income of an out-of-state trust. 
As suggested, it would justify a wealth or property tax on the 
value of the beneficiary’s equitable interest in the trust, which, 
as Professor Spivack indicates, is a property interest.108 
 Although initially attractive, Professor Spivack’s theory—
that a beneficiary’s equitable interest is a property interest that 
confers taxing authority on the state of residence—does not sup-
port her conclusion—that this property interest justifies an in-
come tax on the trust’s undistributed income.109 Indeed, North 
Carolina did not argue that its income tax could somehow be de-
fended as a property tax on the beneficiary’s equitable interest. 
More important, even assuming North Carolina had imposed a 
property tax on the beneficiary, rather than its income tax on the 
trust, the value of the equitable interest, as suggested, would 
have likely proven to be insignificant once the trustee’s discre-
tion was taken into account. All of which is to say that a wealth 
tax is not a sufficient solution to the out-of-state trust problem. 
B. Founder’s Principle 
 Some state tax statutes focus on the residence or domicile 
of the grantor at the time of the trust’s creation.110 Under these 
105 Carla Spivack, Due Process, State Taxation of Trusts and the Myth of 
the Powerless Beneficiary: A Response to Bridget Crawford and Michelle Simon, 
67 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 46, 54 (2019). 
106 Id. 
107 See Greenough, 331 U.S. at 492 (permitting the state of residence to tax 
even out-of-state non-tangible property). 
108 See, e.g., Blair v. Comm’r, 300 U.S. 5, 13 (1937) (equitable interest in 
trust is property); United States v. Harris, 854 F.3d 1053, 1056 (2017) (bene-
ficiary’s discretionary interest in trust is property). 
109 See Spivack, supra note 105, at 54. 
110 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 290.01, subd. 7b(a)(2) (2019). 
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statutes, the trust is treated as if it were a resident and is therefore 
taxed on all of its income—not just in-state income—if the grantor 
was domiciled or resided in the state at the trust’s inception.111 
Hence, the term “founder’s principle” is used. If constitutionally 
valid, the principle could largely eliminate the out-of-state trust 
problem: the state of the grantor’s residence would be permitted 
to tax the trust on an ongoing basis.112 
 In Fielding v. Commissioner of Revenue,113 however, the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded that the principle is in-
consistent with Safe Deposit and therefore violates due process. One 
week after its decision in Kaestner, the Court denied Minnesota’s 
certiorari petition in Fielding,114 raising questions about the ex-
tent to which the principle retains viability. 
1. High Watermark 
 The principle perhaps reached its high watermark in the 
Connecticut Supreme Court decision in Chase Manhattan Bank 
v. Gavin.115 Under the Connecticut statute, an inter vivos trust 
is treated as a resident trust if the grantor was a resident when 
the trust became irrevocable—though it is treated otherwise if there 
is no current Connecticut beneficiary.116 In Gavin, the grantor 
created an inter vivos trust at a time when he was a Connecticut 
domiciliary.117 During the tax year, a beneficiary resided in the 
state, although the grantor had previously died.118 
 The facts in Safe Deposit, where the Court invalidated 
Virginia’s tax, were strikingly similar: the grantor in Safe Deposit 
created an inter vivos (revocable) trust in Maryland while domiciled 
in Virginia for the benefit of a beneficiary in Virginia.119 After the 
111 Id. 
112 Steve R. Akers, ACTEC 2018 Annual Meeting Musings, BESSEMER TR. 
(Mar. 2018), https://www.bessemertrust.com/sites/default/files/2018-07/ACTEC 
%202018%20Annual%20Meeting%20Musings_WEBSITE.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/4JG2-HF22]. 
113 Fielding v. Comm’r of Revenue, 916 N.W.2d 323, 330–32 (Minn. 2018), 
cert. denied, Bauerly v. Fielding, 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019). 
114 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019). 
115 733 A.2d 782 (Conn. 1999). 
116 Id. at 789–90. 
117 Id. at 801–03. 
118 Id. 
119 Safe Deposit & Tr. Co., v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 89–92 (1929). 
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grantor’s death, Virginia imposed a tax on the trust at a time 
when the beneficiary still resided in Virginia.120 The Court held 
that the tax violated due process, concluding that there were insuf-
ficient contacts with Virginia to justify it.121 Unable to distin-
guish Safe Deposit, the Gavin court determined that Safe Deposit 
had been undermined by later Supreme Court decisions and that it 
should therefore no longer be followed.122 Finding no due process 
violation, the court sustained the Connecticut tax on all of the 
trust’s income, leaving open the question whether the founder’s 
principle is available where there is no in-state beneficiary.123 
2. “Low Watermark:” Principle Unequivocally Rejected 
 If, as suggested, the principle reached a high watermark 
in Gavin, it reached a “low watermark”—or its nadir—in Fielding. 
Under the Minnesota statute,124 as in the case of the Connecticut 
statute, a trust is treated as a resident trust if the grantor was 
domiciled in the state at inception or when the trust later be-
comes irrevocable.125 All of a resident trust’s income, even if de-
rived from out-of-state sources, is taxable in Minnesota.126 If, on 
the other hand, the trust is treated as a non-resident, it is taxable 
only on income from in-state (Minnesota) sources.127 
 In Fielding, a Minnesota domiciliary created an out-of-state 
trust in 2011.128 Three years after the trust became irrevocable, in 
2014, when the grantor was still domiciled in the state, Minnesota 
sought to tax the trust on income from out-of-state sources.129 
Ruling for the trust, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the 
mere fact that the grantor was domiciled in the state at incep-
tion was an insufficient contact for due process purposes.130 
 The court reasoned that the tax was not imposed on the 
grantor, but rather on the trust, and that he no longer had control 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 94. 
122 Gavin, 733 A.2d at 802. 
123 Id. at 786. 
124 MINN. STAT. § 290.01, subd. 7b(a)(2) (2019). 
125 Fielding v. Comm’r, 916 N.W.2d 323, 328 (Minn. 2018). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 326. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 330–31. 
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over the trust assets in 2014.131 The focus, according to the court, 
must be on the relationship between the taxpayer—the trust, which 
the court treats as an entity separate from the grantor and the 
beneficiaries—and the state.132 The grantor’s contact with the 
state at the trust’s inception did not count for due process purposes, 
under the court’s analysis, given that he no longer had control over 
the trust assets in 2014.133 Nor, parenthetically, did the existence 
of a beneficiary in Minnesota through 2014 count.134 Relying in 
part on Safe Deposit, the court rejected the founder’s principle.135 
 Although this reading of Safe Deposit is certainly a rea-
sonable one, consider an alternative one. As indicated, the grantor 
in Safe Deposit had died before New York sought to tax the trust.136 
It is therefore possible to read Safe Deposit narrowly: whatever 
the status of the founder’s principle as a general matter, it could 
not be invoked once the grantor had died. Even if, in other words, 
the grantor’s residence in the taxing state at inception could be a 
sufficient contact, it ceased to be relevant in Safe Deposit at the 
grantor’s death. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. Contrast this with the Kaestner Court’s conclusion that a trust “is 
not a distinct legal entity.” N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 
1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213, 2218 (2019) (quoting Americold Realty Tr. 
v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016 (2016)). 
133 Fielding, 916 N.W.2d at 330–31. Note, however, that the court’s treat-
ment of the grantor’s connection to the trust as irrelevant is not consistent 
with Kaestner, where the Court indicates that connections between the state 
and (i) the grantor, (ii) the trustee, and/or (iii) the beneficiaries are to be con-
sidered alone or in combination with each other in determining the sufficien-
cy of the contact with the taxing state. Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220. 
134 Fielding, 916 N.W.2d at 331. 
135 See also Linn v. Dep’t of Revenue, 2 N.E.3d 1203, 1210 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2013) (indicating the state could cite “no cases finding a grantor’s in-state 
residency is a sufficient connection for due process with an inter vivos trust” 
and concluding tax on out-of-state trust’s undistributed income was constitu-
tionally impermissible); Blue v. Dep’t of Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1990) (tax on undistributed income constitutionally impermissible even 
though grantor resided in the state when she created the revocable trust and 
when it became irrevocable at her death); Residuary Tr. A v. Dir., 27 N.J. Tax 
68, 76 (2013) (rejecting Gavin’s use of settlor’s domicile as a sufficient basis to 
tax out-of-state trusts); Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. v. Murphy, 203 
N.E.2d 490, 491 (N.Y. 1964) (rejecting New York’s argument that, because 
grantor was domiciled in the state when his revocable trust became irrevoca-
ble at his death, it could tax its undistributed income). 
136 Mercantile-Safe Deposit, 203 N.E.2d at 491. 
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 Whether this narrow reading is correct was important in 
Fielding, where the grantor was still alive and residing in Min-
nesota when the tax was imposed. Under a more expansive reading, 
adopted by the Fielding court, Safe Deposit rejected the founder’s 
principle in its entirety, making the grantor’s residence in the state, 
either at inception or during the tax year, an insufficient contact. 
Which reading is correct—or, more accurately, which one will ulti-
mately prevail—is of course an open question. But to the extent 
the Fielding reading is correct, states will not be able to employ the 
founder’s principle as a solution to the out-of-state trust problem. 
3. Fault Line in Supreme Court: Stare Decisis 
 Why didn’t the Court grant Minnesota’s certiorari petition 
in Fielding to resolve which of these readings is correct? Had it done 
so, it would have had an opportunity to address not only the va-
lidity of the founder’s principle but also other issues Kaestner left 
unresolved. Why, therefore, did the petition fail to secure the neces-
sary (four) votes? Although of course necessarily speculative, the 
answer may lie in the tension among the Justices over stare decisis. 
 The Kaestner majority stressed the narrowness of its holding: 
to the extent a state seeks to justify a tax on the undistributed 
income of an out-of-state trust solely on the basis of the beneficiary’s 
residence, it violates due process unless the beneficiary has control 
over the income.137 And in rejecting North Carolina’s argument that 
Safe Deposit had been implicitly overruled, the majority maintained 
that “[t]he aspects of the case noted here are consistent with the 
pragmatic approach reflected in” other cases.138 The majority was, 
in other words, anxious to avoid overruling Safe Deposit while 
leaving for future consideration as much of the case as possible. 
This of course leaves the status of aspects of Safe Deposit not 
implicated in Kaestner unresolved. 
 The concurring Justices, on the other hand, twice indicate 
in the course of a rather short opinion that every aspect of Safe 
Deposit, as well as Brooke, remains binding—and further indicate 
that nothing in the majority opinion should be read to suggest 
otherwise.139 Perhaps the four liberal Justices, who formed part 
of the majority, refused to vote in favor of Minnesota’s certiorari 
137 See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
138 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2221 n.6. 
139 Id. at 2226–28 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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petition out of concern that a decision in Fielding to overrule any 
aspect of Safe Deposit (or Brooke) would be cited by the other 
side in a battle over abortion and the validity of Roe v. Wade.140 So, 
plausibly, from the vantage point of the four liberal Justices, the 
safer strategy was to embrace as little of Safe Deposit and Brooke as 
necessary in Kaestner and to avoid the fuller examination of these 
cases that a grant of certiorari in Fielding would have entailed.141 
 In short, it may well be that the denial of certiorari in 
Fielding, together with the decision in Kaestner, has more to do 
with stare decisis than state taxing power. As suggested, the 
concurring Justices in Kaestner were explicit about their unwill-
ingness to reconsider any aspect of Safe Deposit, a precedent on 
which the Fielding court relied.142 And at least some of those in 
the majority may not have wanted to take a position in Fielding, 
or Kaestner, that would “normalize” the overruling of precedent 
given the dispute over abortion, as well as other issues, that is 
perhaps on the horizon. So the denial of certiorari in Fielding, 
together with the decision in Kaestner, may simply reflect the 
fault line developing in the Court over stare decisis.143 
140 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992) (reaffirming Roe). 
141 An additional dynamic may also help explain the tension among the 
Justices: the typical conservative-liberal divide over economic issues. See, 
e.g., NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW 
PARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 4–5, n.10 (2019). Whereas 
the liberal Justices may have been concerned about distributive implications 
and the resulting inequity, the conservative Justices who wrote or joined in 
the concurring opinion may have been more sensitive to a different set of is-
sues: the need to minimize government intervention, concern about the scope 
of the states’ taxing power and the related question of federalism. But see South 
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2094 (2018) (conservative Justices (but 
not Chief Justice Roberts) voting to permit the states to adopt legislation de-
signed to close down a “judicially created tax shelter”). 
142 It is not without irony that, on the very same day Kaestner was decided, 
the three concurring Justices joined (or wrote) the majority decision in Knick v. 
Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), which overruled a 1985 precedent un-
der the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause (Williamson County Regional Plan-
ning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)). 
While thus willing to overrule a 1985 precedent, the three concurring Justices 
simultaneously declared that 1928 and 1929 due process precedents are be-
yond re-examination, in effect peremptorily announcing their views on cases 
involving different fact patterns that may eventually come before the Court. 
143 A similar dynamic could play out should a wealth tax be enacted. In 
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895), the Court held 
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4. Impact on the Founder’s Principle 
 Where does this leave the founder’s principle? None of the 
six Justices in the majority makes their thinking explicit about 
whether Safe Deposit’s rejection of the principle should be modified 
or overruled. There was no need for the majority to do so given 
that the Kaestner grantor resided in New York, not North Carolina, 
when he created the trust.144 Resolving the issue before the Court, 
i.e., determining whether North Carolina could tax the trust based 
solely on the residence of an in-state beneficiary, did not require 
a more extensive examination of Safe Deposit. 
 But if, for example, a case with Fielding-type facts—an in-
state beneficiary and a grantor residing in the state at inception 
and during the tax year as well—were to come before the Court, 
that a tax on income from property was a direct tax and was therefore uncon-
stitutional because not apportioned as required in Article I, section 9, clause 
4—the Court having earlier held that a tax on real property was also a direct 
tax. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881). If this aspect of Pollock 
remains viable, a wealth tax would likely fail as an unapportioned direct 
tax. Arguing in support of a wealth tax, some maintain, however, that Pollock 
should be overruled in favor of the Court’s earlier approach in Hylton v. United 
States, 3 U.S. 171, 175 (1796), under which the direct-tax concept was given 
narrow scope. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1999). The adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, the ar-
gument goes, undermined Pollock entirely. Id. at 5. In National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, however, Chief Justice Roberts intimated 
that a critical aspect of Pollock remains intact, observing that the Court had 
applied the Pollock principle that income from property is a direct tax even 
after the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted. 567 U.S. 519, 571 (2012) (cit-
ing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218–19 (1920)). While this point was 
made only by the Chief Justice, one could easily imagine that the liberal justices—
concerned about the impact on Roe v. Wade—would be unwilling to declare 
Pollock dead, just as they were unwilling to overrule Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of 
Baltimore v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929) and Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27 
(1928). If this proves to be the case, an unapportioned wealth tax would likely 
be declared unconstitutional, not only by the conservative justices who refused to 
revisit these pro-taxpayer precedents in Kaestner, but also by the liberal justices. 
Parenthetically, a wealth tax could plausibly be saved from constitutional 
challenge by giving taxpayers an election: voluntarily choose to pay the wealth tax 
or instead be subject to a higher income tax rate (or perhaps a higher estate tax 
rate). See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 574 n.11 (upholding a tax on those 
who chose not to comply with the individual mandate in Obamacare even though 
Congress lacked the constitutional authority to impose the mandate directly). 
144 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2218. 
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the Justices in the majority would need to undertake such an 
examination. In doing so, they could, for example, decide that 
the grantor’s residence at inception, in conjunction with an in-state 
beneficiary, is a sufficient contact. Or they could decide that, even 
if there is no in-state beneficiary, the grantor’s residence at in-
ception is a sufficient contact in itself. In either case, they would 
need to overrule Safe Deposit. Or they might decide not to over-
rule it but to read it narrowly, limiting it to its facts and thus 
making it permissible for the state to impose its tax where both 
the grantor and a beneficiary continue to reside in the state dur-
ing the tax year.145 
 On the other hand, the three concurring Justices, having 
concluded that every aspect of Safe Deposit remains binding,146 
would surely reject the founder’s principle. Thus, in a case where 
the state seeks to tax a trust solely on the basis of the grantor’s 
residence at the trust’s inception, the concurring Justices would 
undoubtedly find a violation of due process. And even if there 
were, in addition, an in-state beneficiary at the time the tax was 
imposed, they would presumably reach the same conclusion given 
the presence of such a beneficiary in Safe Deposit. Thus, in a case 
like Gavin, where there was an in-state beneficiary and the de-
ceased grantor had resided in the state at inception, the concur-
ring Justices would likely invalidate the tax (contrary to the Gavin 
court’s holding).147 But in a case where the grantor was still alive, as 
145 The majority indicates that, in assessing the grantor’s connection to the 
trust, the grantor’s level of control over the trust assets is the critical deter-
minant. Id. at 2222. And while the majority does go on to say that it does not 
decide what level of control would suffice to justify a tax on the trust imposed 
by the state of the grantor’s residence, id. at 2222 n.7, the clear implication is 
that some level of control would be essential. See id. This would appear to be 
inconsistent with the founder’s principle, which does not depend on continu-
ing control. But whether continuing control would be required where the 
grantor resided in the state at inception (and perhaps still lives in the state) 
and where there is also an in-state beneficiary is not clear. 
146 See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
147 Although the facts in Gavin are very similar to those in Kaestner, one 
factual distinction makes it difficult to predict how the Justices in the 
Kaestner majority would view a case like Gavin. In Kaestner, the beneficiary’s 
residence in North Carolina was the only basis for imposing the tax. 139 S. 
Ct. at 2218. The grantor did not reside in North Carolina at inception or oth-
erwise. Id. In Gavin, in contrast, the grantor did reside in the taxing state 
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in Fielding, whether the concurring Justices would adopt an expan-
sive or narrow reading of Safe Deposit remains unclear—although 
one could reasonably speculate that they would opt for the former 
given their emphatic embrace of all aspects of the decision. 
5. Borrowing Jurisdictional Considerations 
 The validity of the founder’s principle could possibly also be 
influenced by jurisdictional considerations. As suggested, Kaestner 
indicates that the Court borrows from its adjudicative-jurisdiction 
cases in applying due process in the tax context.148 In Hanson v. 
Denckla,149 a foundational jurisdiction case, cited in Kaestner,150 
the Court determined that a Florida court lacked jurisdiction over a 
Delaware trustee even though the person who created the trust, as 
well a beneficiary, resided in Florida at the time of the litigation.151 
 If Hanson were applied on a parallel basis in the tax con-
text, it could possibly cut against the founder’s principle. For if 
the courts in a state where the grantor resides at the time of lit-
igation are not permitted to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-
state trustee on that basis, a tax imposed on a trust by the state 
where the grantor resided when it was created might similarly 
fail for lack of connection between the trustee and the taxing 
state.152 The founder’s principle might therefore be vulnerable to 
(Connecticut) at inception. 733 A.2d 782, 787 (Conn. 1999). Given the apparent 
willingness of the Justices in the majority to combine different contacts, Kaestner, 
139 S. Ct. at 2220, it is possible that they would treat the grantor’s residence 
in Connecticut at inception, in conjunction with the residence of a beneficiary 
in the state during the tax year, as a sufficient basis for taxing the trust. 
148 Id. at 2224 n.11. 
149 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
150 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220, 2224 n.11. 
151 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251–52. 
152 In Hanson, in concluding that the Florida courts lacked jurisdiction 
over the Delaware trustee, the Court indicates that the grantor resided in 
Pennsylvania, not Florida, when she created the trust. Id. at 252. To the extent 
this can be read to imply that the Pennsylvania courts would have had juris-
diction over the Delaware trustee, it would lend support to the founder’s principle. 
It would, however, ordinarily be inconsistent with the parties’ expectations (trustee 
and grantor)—and perhaps therefore inconsistent with due process principles—to 
allow the courts in the state where the grantor resides at inception to exercise 
adjudicative jurisdiction over the trustee solely on that basis. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 267 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“reasonable 
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attack not only on the basis of how Safe Deposit is read—or in-
deed whether it is partially overruled—but also on the basis of a 
“borrowing” from the adjudicative-jurisdiction analysis in Hanson. 
6. Founder’s Principle v. Situs and Jurisdictional  
Considerations 
 Jurisdictional considerations may account for what would 
otherwise be a subtle distinction between the founder’s principle 
and the concept, endorsed in Kaestner, permitting the state where 
the trust is under administration (the trust’s situs) to impose its 
tax.153 Consider, for example, a testamentary trust, typically 
having its situs in the state where the decedent was domiciled 
and her will admitted to probate.154 Courts in the situs state have 
jurisdiction over the trustee and all beneficiaries concerning 
matters of administration, even if they have no other contact with 
the situs state.155 Permitting the situs state to exercise such ju-
risdiction is perhaps driven by practical necessity: were it otherwise, 
in the case where beneficiaries reside in different states, no one fo-
rum would be available to resolve with finality all trust-related 
disputes. And because the situs state offers its courts as such a 
forum, Kaestner sensibly permits taxation in the situs state.156 
 If, however, the trust was to change its situs to another 
state, the original state could no longer rely on situs as a justifi-
cation for imposing its tax. Income earned in years after the 
change would cease to be taxable, in other words, in the original 
state. Under the founder’s principle, in contrast, the state of the 
to infer in most situations that the testator or settlor expected the trustee to 
administer the trust at his or its place of business or domicil [sic]”—although 
comment d. indicates that trustees may be subject to jurisdiction of other courts 
where there is an appropriate basis); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 
462, 474 (1985) (discussing whether it was reasonably foreseeable defendant 
would be required to litigate in forum state is critical to due process analysis). 
153 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220 (“tax based on the site of trust administra-
tion is constitutional”). 
154 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539, 
545 (D.C. 1997) (testamentary trust has situs in state of decedent’s domicile 
and, therefore, state is constitutionally permitted to impose its tax given the 
benefits it offered of “continuing, principal jurisdiction” over the trust). 
155 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1959). 
156 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2220. 
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decedent’s domicile might be permitted to continue taxing the 
trust indefinitely even if, during the tax year, there was no other 
contact to justify the tax.157 Thus, the reach of the founder’s 
principle is potentially more expansive and, as a result, perhaps 
more difficult, unless cabined, to defend constitutionally. 
 In the end, whether or not the founder’s principle remains 
viable as an effective solution to the out-of-state trust problem 
remains unclear. To be sure, the Kaestner Court did not address 
the question. But the lack of a single vote to overrule any aspect 
of Safe Deposit, along with the denial of certiorari in Fielding—a 
compelling case for application of the principle158—is telling.159 
C. Grantor Trust: Taxing the Grantor on the Trust’s Income 
1. Background 
 In a series of private letter rulings,160 the IRS has approved 
a technique that enables taxpayers to use an out-of-state trust more 
157 In Linn v. Department of Revenue, the state made just such a claim, but 
the court rejected it. 2 N.E.3d 1203, 1210 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); see also Blue v. Dep’t 
of Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting founder’s 
principle, invoked by state, where “no ongoing protection or benefit to the 
trust”); Fielding v. Comm’r, 916 N.W.2d 323, 333 (Minn. 2018) (“existing rela-
tionship” between trust and state required). 
158 In Fielding, not only was the grantor domiciled in Minnesota at the 
trust’s inception, he continued to be domiciled in the state when the trust be-
came irrevocable and during the tax year in question. 916 N.W.2d at 330. In 
addition, a beneficiary was also domiciled in the state. Id. And the trust owned 
stock in a Minnesota Subchapter S corporation (i.e., a corporation that passes 
its income through to its shareholders, here the trust), which in turn owned 
property physically located in the state. Id. at 331. Finally, a Minnesota law 
firm drafted the instrument, which made the state’s law controlling. Compare 
id., with Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985) (choice-of-
law provision, although not determinative, not to be ignored). 
159 Were a case to arise where the only contact was the grantor’s residence 
at inception, it seems unlikely that any of the Justices in the majority would 
find this a sufficient contact. For, in the case of grantor-based contacts, the 
majority indicated that the grantor’s level of retained control should be the 
focus. Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2222 n.7. While the majority indicated that the 
necessary level of control remains an open question, a requirement of some 
level of continuing control is apparently contemplated. Id. 
160 Many such rulings have now been issued. For a sample of recent ones, 
see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2019-25-006 (June 21, 2019); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
2019-25-005 (June 21, 2019); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2019-08-005 (Feb. 22, 2019); 
2020] KAESTNER FAILS 681 
easily.161 Under the technique, a taxpayer in a state that imposes 
an income tax conveys investment assets to a trust.162 The trust is 
drafted to make sure that it does not constitute a grantor trust for 
federal tax purposes.163 If it were a grantor trust, all of the trust’s 
income would be taxable for federal purposes on the grantor’s tax 
return.164 But if the trust is drafted to make it a non-grantor 
trust, its income is not taxable to the grantor for federal purposes.165 
And to the extent that the state follows federal law, the trust’s 
income would not be reported on the grantor’s state income tax 
return either.166 If, as is always the case, the trust is located in a 
state without an income tax, the trust’s undistributed income is 
not subject to state income tax—thereby permitting the grantor 
to avoid her home state’s income tax on investment income.167 
 Prior to the private letter rulings, the difficulty with the 
technique had been the federal gift tax. Typically, when assets 
are conveyed to a non-grantor trust, gift tax liability is triggered, 
resulting in a cost that would ordinarily deter taxpayers from 
adopting the technique.168 But, surprisingly unconcerned about 
the impact on the states, the IRS approved a structure in the rul-
ings under which the trust is treated as a non-grantor trust for 
income tax purposes even though the creation of the trust did 
not result in a completed gift for gift tax purposes or any gift tax 
liability.169 Thus, taxpayers using this technique could freely 
(i.e., without paying gift tax170) transfer investment assets to a 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2019-08-004 (Feb. 22, 2019); and I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
2019-08-003 (Feb. 22, 2019). 
161 For a discussion of the strategy, see Schoenblum, supra note 23, at 1963–67. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 See Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184 (“grantor takes into account in 
computing the grantor’s income tax liability all items of income, deduction, 
and credit to which the grantor would have been entitled had the trust not 
been in existence ....”). 
165 See Schoenblum, supra note 23, at 1963–67. 
166 Most states follow the federal grantor-trust rules. Id. at 1964. 
167 Id. 
168 See Abusive Trust Tax Evasion Schemes—Questions and Answers, IRS 
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed 
/abusive-trust-tax-evasion-schemes-questions-and-answers [https://perma.cc 
/FJ6C-H5JC].
169 See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
170 The making of a completed gift does not necessarily result in gift tax li-
ability given the gift tax exemption, under which no gift tax is payable until 
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non-grantor trust and thereby avoid paying state tax on income 
the assets generated while held in the trust. 
2. New York Expands Grantor Trust Concept 
 In 2014, New York, a state which imposes an income tax, 
sought to close down this technique.171 It amended its tax stat-
ute to provide that, if a taxpayer used this technique, the trust 
would be treated as a grantor trust for state tax purposes even 
though it would be treated as a non-grantor trust for federal 
purposes.172 More specifically, under the amendment, where a 
grantor makes a contribution to a trust that is not a completed gift 
for federal gift tax purposes,173 the trust is treated as a grantor 
trust for New York income tax purposes—requiring the grantor 
to report all of the trust’s income on her state tax return.174 
 In broad terms, a trust is treated as a grantor trust for 
federal tax purposes where the grantor has certain powers over, 
or interests in, the trust.175 The premise is that, in such a case, 
the grantor has not fully relinquished control over the trust as-
sets and should therefore be treated for income tax purposes as 
if the trust did not exist. And, as indicated, states that impose 
an income tax typically follow the federal grantor trust rules,176 
treating the income of a grantor trust as taxable to the grantor 
for state tax purposes. 
 The New York amendment severed the connection between 
the federal and state rules, treating all so-called incomplete gift 
trusts (trusts structured so that transfers to it are not a completed 
gift) as grantor trusts for state purposes.177 Under the amendment, 
the taxpayer makes aggregate gifts during her life in excess $11,400,000 (un-
der current law). I.R.C. § 2505 (2012). But even though no gift tax is due on 
account of the exemption, whether or not a completed gift has occurred is 
nonetheless consequential: all completed gifts are in effect included in the 
donor’s estate tax calculation at the time of death. I.R.C. § 2001(b) (2012). 
171 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b)(41) (McKinney 2019). 
172 Id. 
173 For the rules that enable a person making a contribution to a trust to 
render the gift incomplete for gift tax purposes, see Treas. Reg. § 20.2511-2 
(as amended in 1999). 
174 N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b)(41) (McKinney 2019). 
175 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 673–76, 678. 
176 See Schoenblum, supra note 23, at 1964. 
177 Id. 
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if a New York taxpayer creates an incomplete gift trust, all of the 
trust’s income must be reported on the taxpayer’s state return 
even if the trust is a non-grantor trust for federal purposes.178 
 The New York model, if expanded, could possibly go a long 
way toward solving the out-of-state trust problem. To illustrate, 
assume New York (or any state that imposes an income tax) 
amended its tax statute to provide that a trust created by a resident 
where the grantor retains control, de facto or otherwise, is to be 
treated as a grantor trust for state tax purposes regardless of 
the trust’s status as a non-grantor trust for federal purpose. All 
of the trust’s income would then be reportable on the grantor’s 
New York return, even though the income would be reportable for 
federal purposes on the trust’s return, and the out-of-state trust 
would no longer provide an escape from New York income tax.179 
 Would such an expanded grantor trust concept violate due 
process? Note first the difference between this concept and North 
Carolina’s position in Kaestner. Whereas North Carolina sought to 
tax the trust on its undistributed income based on the beneficiary’s 
contact with the state (residence), the grantor-trust approach 
would enable the state where the grantor resides to tax the grantor 
on the trust’s income. While rejecting North Carolina’s position, the 
Court explains and tacitly reaffirms two precedents upholding an 
estate tax in the grantor’s estate on assets in an out-of-state trust.180 
 The Court’s discussion of these precedents suggests that 
the due process analysis in the case of a tax imposed on a grantor 
178 Id. Parenthetically, as a result of 2017 federal tax legislation, Tax Cuts 
& Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2091 (2017), under which the gift tax 
exemption has been substantially increased; I.R.C. § 2505; 26 C.F.R. § 601.602 
(federal gift tax exemption of $11,400,000 in 2019), the New York amendment 
has lost much of its force. New York taxpayers are now able to make completed 
gifts to their out-of-state trusts without as much concern about gift tax liabil-
ity because of the increased gift tax exemption. 
179 Under the grantor-trust approach, if the grantor were to move to an-
other state without an income tax after having contributed investment assets 
to the trust, the trust’s income would no longer be subject to state taxation. But 
this makes sense in that, had the trust not been created, the investment-asset 
income would have ceased to be taxable at the state level once the move was 
accomplished. The grantor-trust approach, in other words, works to close down 
the out-of-state trust strategy but does not place taxpayers in a worse position 
than if no trust had been created. See Schoenblum, supra note 23, at 1964. 
180 N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 
S. Ct. 2213, 2225 (2019). 
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by the state where the grantor resides distills down to this ques-
tion: whether the grantor has sufficient control over, or interest in, 
the trust to justify the tax.181 While the Court framed the issue 
analogously in assessing the validity of the tax imposed on the 
Kaestner trust—whether the beneficiary residing in North Carolina 
had sufficient control over, or interest, in the trust—it explicitly 
left open the question whether a lower level of control would suf-
fice where a state seeks to justify a tax on the grantor.182 
3. Grantor Control: How Much Is Necessary to Satisfy Due 
Process? 
 In the first precedent, Curry v. McCanless,183 the grantor had 
created an out-of-state trust and had retained complete control over 
the trust assets exercisable at his death (i.e., he had retained a 
general power of appointment) as well as the right to receive 
trust income during his life. The domicile state taxed the trust 
assets, treating the grantor as if he had owned the trust’s assets. 
Kaestner explains that the decedent’s control was sufficiently 
extensive to justify the tax.184 In the second precedent, Graves v. 
Elliot,185 the grantor again created an out-of-state trust and 
again retained control, but in this case the control was in the form 
of a revocation power.186 Kaestner explains that, as in Curry, the 
grantor’s control was sufficient to validate the domicile state’s 
estate tax on the trust’s assets.187 It then observes that “the Court 
181 Professor Schoenblum argues that the New York’s grantor-trust concept 
is unconstitutional, emphasizing that the New York statute deviates from the def-
inition of a grantor trust under federal law and from the definition under the 
law of every state that maintains a grantor-trust concept. Schoenblum, supra 
note 23, at 1993–94. He does, however, intimate that, where a grantor retains 
sufficient control over trust assets such that the trust should be ignored, it 
would be constitutionally permissible for the state to tax the grantor on the 
trust’s income. Id. at 1990. 
182 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2222 n.7. 
183 307 U.S. 357, 360 (1939). 
184 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2222; see also Curry, 307 U.S. at 370 (“decedent’s 
power to dispose of the intangibles was a potential source of wealth which 
was property in her hands”). 
185 307 U.S. 383, 384 85 (1939). 
186 See also Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 626 (1916) (grantor’s revo-
cation power over trust permitted Wisconsin, where grantor resided, to impose 
an inheritance tax on out-of-state trust). 
187 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2222. 
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did not have occasion in Curry or Graves to explore whether a 
lesser degree of control by a settlor also could sustain a tax by 
the settlor’s domicile ....”188 And, as indicated, the Court adds that 
“we do not today address that possibility ....”189 
 Which raises the question: what is the necessary level of 
grantor control before a state can employ the grantor-trust concept 
to tax the grantor on the trust’s income? For federal tax purposes, 
there is an implicit assumption underpinning the grantor-trust 
concept, as well as certain key estate tax provisions, in terms of 
grantor control: that the grantor’s choice of trustee, in combination 
with the terms of the trust, can give the grantor sufficient control 
to justify treating the grantor as if she owned the trust assets.190 
188 Id. at 2222 n.7. 
189 Id. The Court also indicates that its “decision does not address state 
laws that consider the in-state residency of a beneficiary as one of a combina-
tion of factors, that turn on the residency of a settlor, or that rely only on the 
residency of noncontingent beneficiaries ....” Id. at 2225 (emphasis added). 
190 For example, I.R.C. section 674(a) establishes a general rule under 
which the grantor is treated as owning the trust’s assets where the trustee is 
given discretion regarding distributions. And while there are several important 
exceptions—applicable in general where the trust instrument constrains the 
trustee’s discretion, where the discretion can only be exercised with the con-
sent of a party with an adverse interest, or where the trustee is independent, 
as defined in section 674(c)—none undermines the underlying idea that a 
grantor who gives a friendly or non-adverse trustee sufficient discretion can 
be treated as having retained enough control to warrant the attribution of the 
trust’s income to the grantor. Two other income-tax sections expand on this 
theme. Under section 679(a)(1), the grantor is treated as the owner of assets 
in a foreign trust, with no exceptions, where the trust designates a U.S. bene-
ficiary. And under section 677(a)(1)–(a)(3), attribution of ownership/income is 
required where the trustee is given discretion to make distributions to the 
grantor or her spouse. In the estate tax context, sections 2036(a)(2) and 
2038(a)(2) treat the grantor as owning trust assets where the grantor can ex-
ercise control by herself or “in conjunction with any person.” In United States 
v. O’Malley, the grantor named himself and two others as trustees. 383 U.S. 
627, 629, 634 (1966). Because his two co-trustees could outvote him, the gran-
tor’s control was limited. Yet the Court held, based on the “in conjunction 
with” language in the predecessor section to section 2036(a)(2), that the 
trust’s assets should be included in the grantor’s estate, reflecting the as-
sumption underlying this language that the grantor’s selection of a trustee 
can enable the grantor to enjoy continuing control. And while the outcome in 
O’Malley would have been different had the grantor not been a trustee based 
on the statutory language, the premise remains that attribution to the gran-
tor based on an assumption of continuing control can be appropriate where 
the grantor gives discretion to her chosen trustee. 
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 Although the Code is not explicit about this rationale, 
these income and estate tax provisions presumably reflect the 
psychological reality that a trustee chosen by the grantor will 
feel some sense of obligation to accommodate, and perhaps defer to, 
the wishes of the grantor in administering the trust and addressing 
the needs of the grantor’s children and other family members. It 
is surely not likely that a grantor would choose a trustee she per-
ceived to be potentially indifferent to her concerns; nor is it likely 
that the trustee would feel comfortable in frustrating those con-
cerns. There is, in other words, a social contract between the 
grantor and trustee. 
 To be sure, the grantor’s control over the trustee is not 
capable of legal enforcement. Indeed, abdicating to the wishes of 
the grantor could constitute a breach of the trustee’s duty to the 
beneficiaries.191 But, as a practical matter, there is typically sig-
nificant space for the trustee to exercise discretion with an eye 
towards the grantor’s wishes without falling into a breach of duty. 
 A grantor who creates a trust for the benefit of family giv-
ing the trustee a measure of discretion has not, in substance, 
fully relinquished control. Indeed, at the federal level, as sug-
gested, income and estate tax provisions reflect this reality. And 
if Congress were to broaden the grantor trust rules to include all 
discretionary trusts for the benefit of the grantor’s family, with 
the states adopting a parallel approach, it is difficult to conceive 
of a viable constitutional challenge. Likewise, there is no justifi-
cation for imposing a constitutional constraint on the states that 
would prevent them from broadening the grantor-trust concept 
without federal legislation.192 No extant precedent stands in the 
way—and, most critically, the only defense offered in support of the 
strategy is that the Constitution requires that it be permitted.193 
191 See Estate of Wall v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 300, 312 (1993) (“trustee would 
violate its fiduciary duty if it acquiesced in the wishes of the settlor”). 
192 Although Professor Schoenblum argues that New York’s grantor-trust 
approach is unconstitutional, he does imply that he would reach a different 
conclusion if the scope of grantor-trust status were enlarged for federal pur-
poses and New York simply followed the federal template. See Schoenblum, 
supra note 23, at 1993–94, 1997–98. He does not explain why a change in the 
federal statutory treatment of a trust should have an impact on the constitu-
tional scope of the states’ taxing power. 
193 For an early article exploring the modest use of the grantor-trust con-
cept in the context of the out-of-state trust problem, see Roger John Traynor, 
State Taxation of Trust Income, 22 IOWA L. REV. 268, 284–85 (1937); see also 
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 In short, until the grantor unequivocally surrenders con-
trol over investment assets via an outright gift, the state in which 
the grantor resides ought to be able to continue taxing her on the 
income those assets generate while held in trust—wherever the 
trust is located.194 
4. Grantor Trust on Kaestner Facts 
 Even on Kaestner-type facts, the grantor-trust concept could 
be helpful. Although the Kaestner beneficiary had not contributed 
assets to the trust or otherwise acted nominally as the grantor, 
North Carolina might have argued that, in substance, the resi-
dent beneficiary was the grantor based on her consent to extend 
the term of the trust (through its decanting). That is, where a bene-
ficiary has a right to receive trust assets at the time of the trust’s 
termination under the instrument but agrees to extend the term, it 
could be argued that the beneficiary in substance received the as-
sets and then reconveyed them to a new trust. Although North 
Carolina did make reference to the fact that the beneficiary had 
consented to extending the trust’s term in its brief, it did not con-
nect this fact to a grantor-trust concept—understandably given the 
lack of such a concept in its statutes.195 
Joseph W. Blackburn, Constitutional Limits on State Taxation of a Nonresident 
Trustee: Gavin Misinterprets and Misapplies Both Quill and McCulloch, 76 
MISS. L.J. 1, 12–13 (2006) (citing Roger John Traynor, State Taxation of Trust 
Income, 22 IOWA L. REV. at 268). 
194 There would surely be no constitutional impediment if a state were to 
attribute to a resident grantor the income of an in-state trust based on a the-
ory of continuing control. Why should the constitutional analysis shift merely 
because an out-of-state trust is used instead? 
195 The concurring opinion maintains that, even absent the decanting, 
North Carolina would have been precluded from taxing the trust until the 
beneficiary reached age 40. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 
1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213, 2227–28 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring). It 
points out that, in Safe Deposit, the Court similarly precluded Virginia from 
taxing the trust while the beneficiary residing there was under the age (25) 
designated in the trust instrument for termination and distribution. Id. And 
it goes on to indicate that no aspect of Safe Deposit should be open for recon-
sideration. Id. Contrast this with the majority’s discussion of Safe Deposit as 
a binding precedent: “The aspects of the case noted here are consistent with 
the pragmatic approach reflected” in cases decided after Safe Deposit. Id. at 
2221 n.6. 
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 Thus, the grantor-trust concept could possibly be imple-
mented not only by the state where the nominal grantor resides 
but also by the state where the beneficiary resides if the facts sug-
gest that the beneficiary has acted, in substance, as a grantor. 
5. Grantor-Trust Concept: Its Limitations 
 The grantor-trust concept has some inherent limitations. 
First, by its very nature, it ceases to be effective once the gran-
tor has died. As a practical matter, the trust’s post-death income 
must either be taxed to the trust or to the beneficiaries—no longer 
to the now-dead grantor. The federal grantor trust concept oper-
ates analogously, with post-death trust income taxed to the trust 
or the beneficiaries. Thus, if a grantor who resides in a state that 
imposes an income tax creates an inter vivos out-of-state trust, the 
grantor-trust concept will only be effective during the grantor’s 
life. After the grantor’s death, assuming that the trust continues to 
be located in a tax-free state, the out-of-state trust issue re-emerges. 
 Second, the concept is similarly limited in the case of a 
testamentary trust since the trust first becomes operative at the 
time of death, at which point it is again no longer possible to tax 
the grantor on post-death trust income. Here, again, the out-of-state 
trust issue can re-emerge after the grantor’s death. Third, if the 
grantor moves to a state without an income tax after having created 
the trust, attributing the trust’s post-move income to the grantor 
would not permit the grantor’s state of residence at inception to 
reach the trust’s income. 
 Do these limitations argue against the grantor-trust con-
cept as a solution? Not at all. Once the grantor has died or moved, 
the policy argument in favor of permitting her state of residence 
at inception to continue taxing the trust’s income weakens. The 
equity and efficiency objections to the out-of-state trust, in other 
words, dissipate considerably—if not disappear—once the gran-
tor is no longer subject to tax by reason of death or a move to an-
other state. For those who find this unsatisfactory, the founder’s 
principle might be an attractive supplement. It would permit the 
grantor’s state of residence at inception to continue taxing the 
trust income indefinitely. But, as indicated, the constitutional 
validity of the principle is in question. 
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D. Throwback 
 While Kaestner does not permit the beneficiary’s state of 
residence to tax the out-of-state trust on its undistributed income 
and Brooke does not permit the state to tax the beneficiary on 
such income, there is no policy justification for permitting the 
beneficiary to escape taxation in her state of residence when the 
income is distributed to her in a later year. After all, the benefits the 
government makes available to a beneficiary and the corresponding 
obligation of residents to contribute to the cost of government do 
not depend on whether the income is immediately distributed or 
instead accumulated and distributed in a later year.196 
 But if a state like North Carolina is to tax the beneficiary 
at the point of such later distribution, a statutory mechanism is 
needed, namely, a throwback rule. In fact, the Kaestner Court sug-
gested that states seeking to combat the out-of-state trust strat-
egy could adopt a throwback rule.197 Indeed, North Carolina’s 
failure to enact the rule presumably cut against its argument that 
the Court’s precedents have created a tax shelter that the states are 
powerless to attack. The Justices apparently thought: why did 
the state fail to take advantage of a readily available remedy? 
 At the federal level, a throwback concept has been utilized 
to undercut the tax advantage that an accumulation of income 
inside the trust provides. In essence, the idea is to tax the bene-
ficiary when distribution is eventually made in a manner that 
forces her to disgorge the benefits that the accumulation created.198 
An interest charge is imposed to offset the advantages that stem 
from deferring the tax liability until the point of distribution.199 
 When New York, in 2014, adopted its grantor-trust con-
cept, it simultaneously adopted a throwback rule200 patterned 
after the federal rule.201 Under this rule, New York imposes a tax 
196 See Curry v. McCanless 307 U.S. 357, 370 (1938) (suggesting “taxation 
is but a means of distributing the cost of government among those who are 
subject to its control and who enjoy the protection of its laws”). 
197 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2225 n.13. 
198 Under current law, the throwback principle generally only applies in the 
case of a foreign trust. I.R.C. § 665(c) (1997). 
199 I.R.C. § 668 (1996). 
200 N.Y. TAX LAW, § 612(b)(40) (McKinney 2019). 
201 As the Kaestner Court indicates, California also utilizes the throwback 
principle. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17745(b) (West 2019); Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. 
at 2225 n.13. 
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on a beneficiary residing in New York on a distribution of accu-
mulated income as if, in rough terms, the beneficiary had received it 
when it was earned. States that enact the rule will need to con-
sider whether to follow the interest-charge approach under the 
federal rule. 
 In essence, states seeking to attack the out-of-state trust 
strategy have three available effective weapons: the founder’s prin-
ciple, the grantor-trust concept, and the throwback rule. While 
the founder’s principle (though constitutionally questionable) tar-
gets the trust, and the grantor-trust concept imposes the tax on 
the grantor, the throwback rule attacks the strategy from the 
beneficiary’s side of the transaction. 
 If these weapons are adopted in tandem, some accommo-
dation would be necessary to prevent double taxation. For ex-
ample, if the state of the grantor’s residence were to apply the 
grantor-trust concept and therefore required the grantor to report 
trust income on her return, subjecting the beneficiary to a throw-
back rule in her state of residence could produce double taxation: a 
tax in the grantor’s state and a second tax in the beneficiary’s 
state at the time of distribution. To the extent the states failed 
to prevent such an outcome, courts could possibly intervene un-
der the Dormant Commerce Clause cases.202 
 To be sure, the throwback rule is not a panacea. As North 
Carolina argued, a beneficiary could move to a tax-free state before 
receiving a distribution and then move back in a post-distribution 
year.203 And while the rule could possibly be designed to prevent 
this kind of avoidance,204 supplementing it with the grantor-trust 
202 See Schoenblum, supra note 23, at 1994. But see Comptroller of Treasury 
of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1802–04 (2015) (not every case of double 
taxation violates the Dormant Commerce Clause). 
203 Kaestner, 139 S. Ct. at 2225–26. 
204 Perhaps, a state could provide that, in the case of such a move, income 
accumulated while the beneficiary resided in the state would remain subject 
to its throwback rule even if the distribution were made after the taxpayer 
moved to another state on the theory that the beneficiary’s right had accrued 
while she was a resident. While taxpayers would likely challenge the consti-
tutionality of this approach, an accrual concept has been applied in analogous 
circumstances. For example, in In re Schibuk, the court held that payments 
the taxpayer received from a partnership in a post-move year had accrued 
while the taxpayer was still a New York resident and were therefore taxable 
in New York. 733 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803–04 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). On the other 
hand, whether a beneficiary can be treated as having an accrued right before 
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concept (or, to the extent constitutionally permissible, the 
founder’s principle) would certainly fortify the states’ response 
to the strategy.205 
IV. ELIMINATING DUE PROCESS AS A CONSTRAINT: 
EMPOWERING CONGRESS 
 An amicus brief in Kaestner suggested that the due pro-
cess constraint on the authority of states to tax out-of-state 
trusts (or other taxpayers) be eliminated.206 Were this to occur, a 
state seeking to tax taxpayers or transactions having connec-
tions outside of its borders would still be subject to judicial con-
trol under the Dormant Commerce Clause and ultimately to 
Congress’s control. There is much to be said for this approach. 
The federalism issues implicated in the tax context would be 
more easily amenable to solution through legislative regulation 
(with litigation under the commerce clause as a back-up).207 And, 
the trustee unequivocally determines to exercise discretion in favor of the 
beneficiary is a debatable question. 
205 In the personal jurisdiction context, some states have enacted legislation 
that is designed to be coterminous with the Due Process Clause: permitting 
the courts to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent that it is constitutionally 
authorized. See, e.g., Cowan v. First Ins. Co., 608 P.2d 394, 398–99 (Haw. 1980) 
(reach of long-arm statute to be determined by due process). Whether a tax 
statute could be drafted similarly—taxing all out-of-state trusts to the extent 
constitutionally permitted—is an interesting question. While such a statute 
would not appear to run afoul of the Due Process Clause—just as its analogue 
in the personal jurisdiction context is permitted—it would be problematic as 
a policy matter given the inevitable administrative difficulty. Neither taxpay-
ers nor the state would be clear about the taxability of a trust until the courts 
ruled on the issue. On the other hand, the continuous need to litigate the ques-
tion, together with the resulting uncertainty, might well deter taxpayers from uti-
lizing the strategy. 
206 Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party at 8, N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner Family 
Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019) (No. 18-457), 2019 WL 1112679, *8. 
207 In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 298 (1992), the Court 
empowered Congress by removing the due process impediment to the tax at 
issue. In South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2084–86 (2018), freed 
from the constraint of due process by its decision in Quill and faced with 
Congressional inaction, the Court altered its Commerce Clause analysis in 
order to close down what it termed a “judicially created tax shelter.” Note also 
that, in Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, Justice Scalia argued 
in dissent that the Dormant Commerce Clause cases should be overruled. 135 S. 
Ct. 1787, 1807–11 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This would leave Congress with 
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indeed, the two key cases limiting the taxation of out-of-state trusts, 
Safe Deposit and Brooke, are based on substantive due process prin-
ciples, stemming from the now-discredited Lochner208 Era (one 
decided in 1928, the other in 1929).209 
 In short, the inequity and inefficiency inherent in out-of-
state trusts could be effectively addressed by Congress—and, if 
necessary, the courts—were the due process constraint eliminated. 
But, unfortunately, Kaestner moves in the opposite direction, reaf-
firming and solidifying the constraint. Indeed, not a single Justice 
the exclusive authority to regulate state taxing power under the Commerce 
Clause. See also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (cit-
ing Justice Scalia and raising question about Dormant Commerce Clause cases). 
208 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905). To the extent Kaestner 
provides support for the out-of-state trust strategy and for the wealthy who 
employ it, it could be argued that it fits well within the spirit of Lochner. See, 
e.g., ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 135 (1987) (“Loch-
nerian decisions flowed partly from the willful defense of wealth and power”). 
But see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 386–90 (1988) (acknowledging this view of substantive 
due process but arguing otherwise). 
209 In rejecting the Virginia tax on due process grounds, the Court in Safe De-
posit indicated that a different conclusion would “result in inescapable and 
patent injustice whether through double taxation, or otherwise.” 280 U.S. 83, 92 
(1929). Such a focus on “injustice” reflects a substantive due process approach. 
See Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(explaining his disagreement with the majority in Safe Deposit, Justice Holmes 
indicates, “I cannot believe that the [Fourteenth] Amendment was intended 
to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohi-
bitions.”); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (a 
primary feature of substantive due process is the protection it provides to lib-
erty and rights the deprivation of which would result in a denial of justice). But, 
as the Court has indicated, its substantive due process precedents are based 
on a “restrained methodology”—a methodology that does not comfortably ac-
commodate Safe Deposit. Id. On the other hand, note that International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), a seminal precedent from which 
modern tax and jurisdictional cases emanate, itself appeared to accept a sub-
stantive due process strand in its focus on “fair play” in the context of determining 
the presence of minimum contacts. See Stephen Goldstein, Federalism and 
Substantive Due Process: A Comparative and Historical Perspective on Inter-
national Shoe and its Progeny, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 976–77 (1995) 
(“fair play ... was attached in International Shoe to a new substantive due 
process test of minimum contacts”). In any event, neither the majority nor 
concurring opinion in Kaestner reveals a concern that Safe Deposit (or Brooke) is 
inconsistent with—or even in tension with—Glucksberg. 
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suggested that Safe Deposit or Brooke should be overruled—re-
flecting perhaps, as suggested, the looming battle over stare decisis. 
CONCLUSION 
 No one defends the out-of-state trust strategy on policy 
grounds. Instead, those who defend it maintain that the Due 
Process Clause requires the states to permit it. Kaestner was the 
vehicle, many had hoped, that would eliminate constitutional 
constraints preventing the states from attacking the strategy. It 
failed. What now? 
 Perhaps the states need to find a more compelling vehicle. 
But given the key precedents that could be read to support the 
strategy and given the current state of affairs in the Supreme 
Court on stare decisis, finding the right vehicle may not be easy. 
Indeed, Fielding was surely a better vehicle than Kaestner, and 
yet the Court denied Minnesota’s certiorari petition one week 
after deciding Kaestner.210 Finding the right vehicle, at least in 
this judicial environment, will therefore be challenging. 
 Legislation is likely to be the more effective option. More 
specifically, if an expansive grantor-trust concept were adopted, 
one that is not tethered to its scope at the federal level, the trust’s 
income would be reportable on the grantor’s state return without 
regard to the trust’s status for federal purposes.211 While Kaestner 
concluded that the presence of an in-state beneficiary was an in-
sufficient contact to justify a tax on the undistributed income of 
an out-of-state trust, one can discern in the majority opinion a 
path left open for the states to tax the grantor, rather than the 
trust, on its income. 
 To be sure, the majority did observe that, in prior cases 
where such a tax was upheld, the grantor had control over the 
trust assets.212 But it also indicated that the required level of 
control in the context of a tax imposed on the grantor is an open 
question and that it may be appropriate to permit the states 
more leeway when they seek to tax an in-state grantor.213 
 Where a grantor creates a discretionary trust for the ben-
efit of her family, she will typically enjoy de facto control over 
210 See supra Section II.B.3. 
211 See supra Section III.C.1. 
212 See supra Section II.B.4. 
213 Id.  
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the trustee as a psychological matter.214 This insight animates 
various federal provisions that tax the grantor on trust assets. 
Analogously permitting the states to tax an in-state grantor on 
trust income until control is fully surrendered—either by out-
right gift or by a gift to a nondiscretionary trust—would enable 
them to eliminate in large part the out-of-state trust strategy. 
No precedent stands in the way.215 The battle over stare decisis 
lurking in the background of Kaestner should therefore not be an 
obstacle. The majority sent another signal—this one more explicit—
to the states: that they are free to use a throwback rule to address 
the problem.216 Supplementing the grantor-trust concept with a 
throwback rule would certainly be salutary. 
 Finally, a few words about what might be considered the 
ultimate question: should due process remain as a constraint in 
the tax context? Although the question is an academic one given 
Kaestner, it is nonetheless an important one. Had the Court 
overruled the taxpayer-friendly precedents and rejected due pro-
cess as a constraint in this context, it would have empowered 
Congress to address the problem. And to the extent Congress 
failed to do so, the states would have been free to find their own 
solution—subject to the courts’ control under the Dormant Com-
merce Clause. But the Kaestner Court chose a different path, forti-
fying the precedents and thereby constraining the states. And if 
the states are unable to find a solution, an abusive strategy dis-
proportionately enjoyed by the wealthy will remain enshrined in 
the Due Process Clause. 
214 See supra Section III.C.3. 
215 See supra Section III.B.4. 
216 See supra Section III.D. 
